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[Though] mathematics is often excluded from the arts....such exclusion does not justify
denial or neglect of the respects in which litl resembles the arts wedo recognize.
- Francis Sparshott
[53. pp. 145-146)
The above comment from a poet and philosopher
expresse s an attit ude wi th which ma ny
mathematicians would probably feel comfortable.
From at least the time of Aris totle, writers of
various philosophical stripes have paid tribute to
the aesthetic appeal of mathematical studies, and
today there ex ists a co nside rab le body of
introspective literature on the affinities between
mathematics and the arts. Certainly the readers of a
journal devoted to humanistic mathematics should
sympathize with any reaffirmation of their subject's
For example, if we claim aesthetic
values are inherent to our doing
mathematics, can we in any way
specify what those values are or the
role they play in our practice?
place among creative human activities . Indeed, to
some Sparshott's remark is surely overcaut ious:
Isn't mathematics already an art?
I believe, however, that we should treat
Sparshott ' s comment more as a suggestion than as
another (and actual ly rather weak) tribute to the
aesthetic nature of our subject By virtue of its not
assuming mathematics to be an art it encourages us
to speculate on the issue. The results of such
speculation may well be fresh insights into the
nature of mathematics, its role among human
endeavors, and even the manner in which
mathematics education should proceed.
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To see thi s, consider the extent to which the
dominant mathematical philosophy of formali sm
concentrates on the rigorou s, analytic structure of
theories and results as opposed to the complex,
creative and often downright hazy methods by
which these results are obtained. In the eyes of
formalism this is not merely a matter of
emphas is-the latter notions are intentionally
brushed aside as irrelelvent to the question "What
is mathematics?" (see, e.g., [HI ]). Can such an
approach poss ibly be consistent with the belief that
mathematics fundamentally engages our aesthetic
Interests, or that il proceeds in manners akin to
those of art? If we truly feel these things about
mathematics, why do we cleave to a philo sophy
and to practices that deny them?
Thus what I see Sparshott suggesting is that we
take our generally unexamined beliefs on this issue
and examine them seriously. For example, if we
claim aes thetic values are inherent to our doing
mathematics, can we in any way speci fy what
those values are or the role they play in our
practice? If we claim mathematics to be an an by
virtue of entailing properties X, Y and Z. are we
prepared to counter the charges that with regard to
an itself, X is irrelevent, Y insuffucient or Z
actually antithetical? Do we know what an is any
more than we know what mathematics is? To
answer questions like these--even just to ask them
intelligently-requires a depth of analysis which
few from either the aesthetics/art or mathematics
sides of the issue have attempted.
While I make no claim of attaining such a depth in
what follows, I do hope I can indicate something
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of what is likely to be involved in the attempt, and
where some of the benefits to be obtained by the
effon may lie.
Aesthetics. Art and Mathematics
In keeping with a practice all too common among
writers on this issue, I have thus far been using
two different terms-art and aesthetics-in a
dangerou sly synonymous way. It is time for a
distinction. By aesthetics I mean the particular type
of inquiry that Scruton [52, p. 15] characterizes as
the "philosop hic stud y of beauty and taste."
Similarly, by "aesthetic" I refer either to an attribute
suc h an inqu iry would study (e.g., aesthet ic
distance) or to some sys tem that embraces these
notions in a particular way (e.g., a culture or era
with an aesthetic different from our own).
An, on the other hand, is a trickier notion with
which to come to grips. Too complex to take as a
primitive term, it is one of those concepts-like
mathematics itselt!-for which we seem to have
enough of a sense to use with impunity and still be
Like the philosopher of art, we are
not so interested in developing the
concepts of beauty and taste per se
as we are in applying these to a
particular-though very broad-
type of activity,
underst ood- at le ast among people with
backgrounds similar to our own. Yet a careful
delineation of the concept always seems beyond
our grasp. Perhaps we might regard this as good
enough, but nagging questions of considerable
import nevenheless keep arising: Is such-and- such
a wonhy enough work of an to merit our attention?
Does its maker merit our support? Should an itself
be publi cally supported? Should it be taught in
schools? Can it be taught at all ? As might be
expected, the closer we get to the "edges" of the
concept- to education, to ethics, to the boundaries
of "non-art"-the tougher the questions get.
Hence arises the philosophy of art.
Al though historical precedents for confusion are
ample, it is almost cenainly mistaken to equate this
laner field with aesthetics [see 54, pp. 15-16]. The
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philosopher of art may well be concerned with
questions of ontology (What is a work of an? A
physical object? A mental state?), epistemology (Is
there such a thing as artistic knowledge? What is it
knowledge of? Is it somehow veriflable'f) or ethics
(Can a work of an be morally neutral? Does its
carryin g any particular moral value affect its status
as an?). Th ese are concerns whose connection
with aesthetics proper is not entirely clear.
Conversely, the aesthetician may well be interested
in our responses to nature or to dreams, or to the
incidents of our daily lives. One may argue that an
is broad enough to embrace these notions as well ,
but this is certainly something to be demonstrated
and not assumed.
So wher~ doe s thi s put us with regard to
mathematics? Ideally, we might wish to establish a
relationship between aesthetics and the philo sophy
of math emati c s analogous to that between
aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Problems
immediately arise, however. On the one hand,
many of the concepts of aesthetics have developed
(even if controversially so) with specific reference
to an, and applying these as they now stand to
mathematics may be unwarranted. But even more
troublesome difficulties arise from the side of the
philosophy of mathematics itself, which in this
century has so estranged itself from aesthetic
concerns that prospects for an immediate dialogue
seem dim. The two disciplines apparently lack a
common language.
It is here that we might appeal to the philosophy of
art. Like the philosopher of an, we are not so
interested in developing the concepts of beauty and
taste per se as we are in applying these to a
parti cular-though very broad-type of activity.
Similarly, we should be willing to admit that the
most important aspects of our subject may well lie
outside the realm of aesthetics. Finally, we can
note from the stan that several important concepts
in the philosophy of art (e.g., representation, form,
the distinction between pure and applied activities)
bear prima facie resemblance with concepts in
mathematics. Possibly this is no more than a
superficial coincidence, but again this is a point
requiring demonstration. (I suspect that in many
instances the coincidence is not superficial .) In
keeping with the sense of Sparshon's suggestion,
we should compare mathematics and an before we
even consider equating them. We may even find
that such an equation may be the least illuminating
of the insights we gain.
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Essentialist Theories
Traditional attempts to formulate philosophies of
art have largely focused on the que stion of
definition-of finding those qualities which
uniquelyconstitute the essence of art. As DeWitt
Parker stated in an influential article from 1939:
The assumption underlying every
philosophy of art is the existence of some
common nature present in all the
arts....There is some...set of marks which,
if it applies to any work, applies to all
works of art, and to nothing el se....{This]
constitutes the definition of an. [P2. p. 61]
Note that this essentialist approach-that of
reducing art to necessary and sufficient
conditions-promises a result not unlike those
formulas for the identity of mathematics (e.g.,
"Mathematics is logic". or "Mathematics is the
study of formal systems") that have arisen in our
own field. The resemblance is deeper than thi s,
however. The very attempts to specify these
qualities in each subject have themselves paralleled
each other in remarkable and significant manners.
Although any atte mpt to classify diverse theories
runs the risk of oversimplification, I shall deal here
with three general forms of essentialist arguments.
The first, realism, involves identifying this essence
Leonardo declared that, "Truly
painting is a science, the true born
child of nature" and some three
centuries later the landscapist
Constable reaffirmed: "Painting is a
science, and should be pursued as an
inquiry into the laws of Nature."
in some relationship between a constructed object
(or "artifact" ) and a world exterior both to that
objec t and its maker. By contrast, expressioni sm
concentrates on relationships between the artifact
and a world interior to either its maker, audience or
both. Fin ally, formalism identifies the essence of
art strictly in terms of qualities contained within the
artifact itself-e.g., the lines , colors or shapes in a
painting, the arrangem ent of tones in a musical
composition, etc.
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I do not wish to imply that all essentialist theories
fit snugly into these categories. Hybrid theories
combining elements from each of these also exist.
as do theories that strike otTin different. often quite
sophisticated and radical, directions (see, e.g.,
[Til & [D3]). For introductory purposes,
however, this scheme (which parallels that of
[H5]) should be adequate, and will also serve to
highlight the paralle ls between traditional
philosophies of an and mathematics. Let us briefly
consider each in turn.
Realism
For centuries realistic views had constituted the
dominant theories of an, and although these
attitudes have generally fallen from favor, both
artists and audiences alike continue to beinfluenced
by their appeal. While a broad spectrum of realistic
views are possible, these theories in general
identify art as a system of knowledge with a status
claim not entirely unlike that of science. Most
explicitly, Leonardo declared that, "Truly painting
is a science, the true born child of nature" and
some three centuries later the landscapist Constable
reaffirmed: "Painting is a science, and should be
pursued as an inquiry into the laws of Nature." By
these lights (which can be clearly discerned in the
works of Aristotle), the arti st reveals reality to us
through ab stract representations of its various
aspects-aspects incapable of such revelation by
any means but art . In some variations of the
theory, these revelations are actually of a "higher"
plane of reality than mere physical existence. For
example, Piet Mondrian viewed his skeletal
arrangements of lines and solid colors as
presenting ima ges of "true reality and true life," a
position more akin to nee-Platonism than the
indu ctive reali sm of Ari stotle. These views are
linked, however, by a conception of art as
essentially a means of discovering truth.
Have attitudes such as these ever been displayed
toward our mathematical "artifacts," and are they
still likely to exert an influence on us today? To
both questions the answers are definitely yes. For
centuries Euclidean geometry did not stand as one
of a multitude of formal geometric systems but was
regarded as representing the Real geometry of Real
Space, based on inductively self-evident truths
abstracted from reality and developed through the
unassailable method of deduction. (Writing before
Eucl id, Aristotle accurately observed some of the
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consequences of rejecting the assertion that the sum
of the angles in any triangle was two right angles.
He abandoned these conclusions because of their
"obvious" inability to square with the evidence of
experience. Spherical geometry, of course. had
already developed a long history, but this was Real
geometry on a Real surfaco--not a model of a non-
Euclidean system. See [T3J.) True, the insistence
upon logical deduction may appear outwardly to be
difficult to reconcile with an, but I believe this
percepti on largely arises from simultaneous
tendencies to downp lay the role of logical
development in an and to overplay its role in
mathematics. The logical "flaws" in Euclid 's
geometry or Newton' s calculus were recognized as
profoundly troublesome, but these problems were
as little compared to the practical insights and
successes the systems as a whole presented (see
[KIl). The knowledge gleaned from mathematics
was looke d upon as genuine knowledge
nonetheless, and throughout this period there was
little doubt that this knowledge was that of reality.
The rise of non-Euclidean geometry required
abandonment of this geometry-as-the-science-of-
real-space conception, but by no means did it spell
the end of realist conceptions of mathematics. By
one view. different geometries or systems of
mathematics could be conceived as separate entities
of a Platonic world of forms , with the
mathematician regarded as a sort of suprascientist
who discovers the properties of these entities. And
Thus while we may be accustomed
to referring to the Mona Lisa itself
as a work of art, the work of art
proper lies in the imaginative
constructions that resulted in
Leonardo's painting it and in our
interpreting it.
although this position ignores seve ral not
inconsiderable aspects of Plato ' s thought on
mathematics, the belief that any well-framed
mathematical question has a definite answer
independent of our existence characterizes the
posit ion known as mathematical Platonism.
Phrased in this manner, the position becomes as
much the creed of a mathematical theology as it
does the basis of a descriptive philosophy. As the
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former it seems to be of practical value to
individual mathematicians [see. e.g., TI]; as a
critical theory it seems as suspect as Mondrian's
supposed ability to envision "true reality." Did art
experience its own "non-Euclideanrevolution?" In
a sense it did, even if its occurence cannot be as
prec isely specified as that of mathematics.
(Although the late-18th and early-19th centuries
figure prominently in the revolutions in both fields.
See [AI].) The process in this case involved-at
least in pan-the realization that representation
itself was neither a necessary nor sufficient
condition for art. Its insufficiency (long
recogni zed) can be ascertained simply by
considering common occurences of representation
that do not qualify as art: courtroom records,
plastic anatomical models, or snapshots (the
history of photography's status as an art provides
an interesting trial case of realistic theories). But
even more telling is the apparent case for
unnecessity. Not only do non-representational
artworks exist. but entire branches of art appear to
be non-representational by nature. Debussy's La
Mer may be taken to represent the sea, but does not
this conclusion follow primarily by virtue of the
work's title alone? Without this title. would the
work still be perceived as resembling the sea more
than it does anything else? Would we even
consider the work in representational terms?
Would we still consider it a work of an? (For this
example see [H5, p. 708J.)
Emile Zola-one of the late 19th century's most
prominent exponents of realism through his ideal
of the naturali stic "experimental novel"-once
characterized art as life seen through a
"temperment." But even from before the time of
Zola it had become increasingly apparent that
realistic theories had been in error in not placing
more emphasis on the role of this "ternperment"
itself. In the philosophies of expressionism this
role would lie at the very heart of the matter.
Expressionism
For an example of an extreme expressionist view.
consider the theory developed in the first half of
this century by the philosophers Benedetto Croce
[C2J and R. G. Collingwood [CI). (These are
actually separate theories, but close enough in both
spirit and detail to be regarded as one for our
purposes.) In this theory an is taken as being
identical with expression. the revealing of an
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internally construc ted mental state. Even more
simply. art is realized imaginative activity. and in
fact stands as the most basic fonn of human
language. Although this is a panicularly broad
pronouncement. it is accompanied by explicit
statements of what an is not. First (and possibly
most difficult ly) it is not any set of existing
physical or symbolic art ifacts such as paintings.
texts or sculpture s. These are simply the necessary
embodiments of the imaginative constructions that
Collingwood calls the "work[s] of an proper" [CI,
p. 37]. Thus while we may be accustomed to
referring to the Mona Lisa itself as a work of art,
the work of art proper lie s in the imaginative
constructions that resulted in Leonardo's painting it
and in our interpreting it. (Along the se line s
Collin gwood approvingly quotes Coleridge 's "we
know a man for a poet by the fact that he makes us
poets" [CI, p. 1I 8J.) Similarly, an should nOI be
confused with any particular kinds of media.
These. rather, are simply the necessary channels
through which particular expressions flow. (Again
from CoIlingwood: "Every gesture that each one of
us makes is a work of an" [C I, p. 285]) Finally,
art should not be ide ntified with any activity
engaged in for a specific purpose or outcome. Art
may be used to represent reality, entertain us or
persuade us, but it does these things en passant ,
Indeed. if any specific purpose guides the
production of a work we are dea ling not with an at
all, but with craft or techno-what Collingwood
calls "an falsely so-called."
This last may seem to place art in a paradoxical
position. On the one hand it is equivalent to the
most basic human attribute (communication) and
on the other it is divorced from purposive human
activiti es. This is resolved through the nature of
the internal constructions of emotions, intuitions
an d ex periences that re sult in successful
expressions. Colli ngwood explains that to attain
these the arti st mu st "experience what all
experience" and commen ts that " in ivory towers art
lan guished" [CI , p . 119] . Similar ly, Croce
disposes of the romantic no tion of the artist as
necessari ly being a specimen of genius (a view
which also haunts mathematics) by not ing that
"inspiration is not something from heaven, but is in
the essence of humanity itself." and that «the man
of genius who poses as that...finds his punishment
in becoming somew hat ridiculous" [C2, p. 16]. In
this theory arti sts are born and not made , but we
are all born artists. Differences are of degree, not
of kind .
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It may seem unlikely that there could be an overall
view of mathemat ics correspo nding to an
expressionist theory of art-particularly a theory as
extreme as that of Croce and Collingwood. It is
somewhat startl ing to find. therefore. that it is not
difficult to find particular passages in these writer ' s
works which are virtually identical to ones found in
the work of such figures as poincare. Brouwer and
it is above all mistaken to confuse
matbematics with its final symbolic
forms, These, rather, are merely
the manifestations of the internal
constructive processes that
constitute the proper identity of
mathematics.
late r members of the constructivist school.
Consider Brouwer's intuitionism [B]. To Brouwer
it is above all mistaken to confuse mathematics
with its final symbolic fonns. These. rather, are
merel y the manifest at ions of the internal
construc tive processes that constitute the proper
identity of mathematics. Other mathematicians may
use their interpretation of these symbols as a basis
for their own constructions, but their interpretation
is itself a personal construction. (Sparshott notes
that both he and H. S. M. Coxeter know the
Pythagorean theorem, but that what "he knows in
knowin g it is something I cannot even imagine"
[S4, p. 33].) To Brouwer, logical rules do not
guide the process of mathematical construction;
rather. a pragmatic logic is effectively created along
the way. Similarly, Collingwood notes that the
artist does not create rules so much as construct
them. These viewpoints do not leave judgements
in either activity purely subjective. however. In
mathematics, such judgements are constrained by
the requirement of constructive existence; in art by
the conunonality of actual human experience. Even
on the point where the theories apparently diverge
most severely- the conception of language-the
difficulty reduces to a difference in terminology .
Croc e and ColHn gwood conclude that art is
language, whereas Brouwer vinually declares that
mathematics is anything but language. But to
Collingwood, language is any expression of
intern al constructions; to Brou wer language is
primarily sym bolic notation (which Collingwood
refers to as "lan guage falsely so-called" and Croce
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as " the mere grammatical").
Though these theories may assumedifferent names
in different fields-expressionism in art,
intuitioni sm or constructivism in mathematics-all
share a focus upon the freedom and constraints of
the creative process as essential to the activity at
hand. In an. expressionism has been particularly
cri ticized for its apparen t disregard for the arti stic
product as an entity onto itself-the theory' s notion
of art istic exi stence appears skewed [H4}.
Similarly, mathematical constructivism establi shes
a criterion of existence often viewed as
unnecessari ly severe ([ill]). In response to the se
charges in both areas , philosophies of fonnalism---
already present in each field-have arisen as
alternatives.
Formalism
Whether in mathematics or in art. formalism in its
purest state is a philosophy of detachment.
Artworks and mathematical systems are viewed as
independent phenomena standing apan from their
creators, their audiences and any external world.
Meanings or values can be considered only with
reference to elements contained within the work
itself. And although ideal formalist criticism may
be diffi cult to achieve in practice, in that ideal
works stand apart even from the history of their
very construct ion. As Werhane puts it, a work
exi sts virtually " in spite of its creator...and its
audience" [W4, p. 99J .
I should make at least one distinction among formal
theories, however-particularly with respect to an.
In the pure state described above-a position
sometimes referred to as absolutism-the meaning
of a work is entirely separated from any quality not
within the work itself. Thus to recognize a work
of an is to recognize such qualities as symmetry,
internal dynamics or the relationships of color and
shape; to create an is to impose these qualities on
an artifac t. How ever, in another brand of
formalism it is important that one look at both the
formal structure of a work as well as any meanings
that may be expressed by that struc ture. Art
effectively becomes defined as symbolic fonn. BUI
unless one wishes to regard virtuall y everything
from everyday language through, say, mathematics
as art . a more precise descriptio n of what
constitutes artistic forms is needed. Such
theories-as for example those of Suzanne K.
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Langer IL] or Nelson Goodman [02]---<:volve
largely into "meta-theories" of syntactic and
semantic rules , and thus to a large extent diverge
from pure formali sm, Simultaneously, however,
they also seem to diverge from the actual
experi ence of creating and appreciating an.
Wri ting with regard to Langer's theory, Scruton
comments that her "analysis gives no procedure for
Whether in mathematics or in art,
formalism in its purest state is a
philosophy of detachment.
Artworks and mathematical systems
are viewed as independent
phenomena standing apart from
their creators, their audiences and
any external world,
interpretation, nothing that would give application
to the claim that in understanding a work of art we
understand it as a sym bol" [52, p. 22].
In mathematics, pure fonnalism---comparable to
aesthetic absolutism-is that view which takes
mathematics to be strictly the study of formal
systems (see [HI]). Where the formalist in art
seeks internal structure, the mathematical formalist
seeks consistency. Where the former detaches
meaning or expression from form. the latter
constructs "uninterpreted" systems.
I feel compelled here to mention that Hilbert (the
"father of formalism") was not a formalist in this
sense, as his introduction to Geometry and the
Imagination [H3] makes abundantly clear. The
metamathematical strategy of Hilbert's Program
required him to treat mathematical systems as
uninterpreted for the sake of a consistency proof-
hardly the same as believing mathematics itself to
be fundamentally uninterpretable or meaningless.
Curry, one of the leading exponents of
mathematical formalism, has himself stated that "it
is unfortunate that many persons identify
fonna1ism with what should be called Hilbertism"
[C3, p. 156]. Indeed, it would be interesting to
determi ne the degree to which the aims and
methods of metamathematics in general parallel
those of, say. Goodman's strategy in Languages of
Art [02J.
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In both mathematics and art formalism has become
the most established theoretic view of this century.
(In both fie lds , in fact, it has independently
acquired the descriptive phrase "Modernism.'} In
mathematics education, its influence-under the
pervasive guidance of Bourbaki and the New
Math-has been nearly universal. However, as
Davis and Hersh ([D4, pp. 343-344]) note, cracks
have begun to show in the formalist wall. The
underlying theme of both [D4] and [D5] is in
essence an assa ult on mathematical formali sm, as
are the selections in [T4]. Similarly. many of the
es says in Arthur Dante ' s recent collecti on [D2]
constitute strong cases against aesthetic formali sm
and its sep aration from human experience and
meaning.
Non-Essentialism
In an often anthologized paper, "The Role of
Theory in Aesthetics" [WI] the philosopher Morris
Weitz argued that the entire essentialist approach to
the philosophy of an is fundamentally misguided
(see also [W3] for an elaboration). To Weitz, an is
an example of what he call s an inherently
undefineable open concept. He develops this more
fully by referring to what he calls the perreniel
flexibility and debatability of art. Art is perennially
In mathematics, pure formalism-
comparable to aesthetic
absolutism-is that view which
takes mathematics to be strictly the
study of formal systems. Where the
formalist in art seeks internal
structure, the mathematical
formalist seeks consistency.
flexible in that it is always capable of expanding its
sc ope to embrace previou sly unconsidered
artifacts, styles , media, e tc. It is perenially
debatable in that not only are the criteria by which
new works are judged subject to continual criticism
and reevalu at ion , but even establi shed works
continue to fall under such scrutiny. Oed ipus Rex
may be established as a masterpiece of tragedy, but
the matter of exac tly which of its qualities grant it
that status continues to be contentious.
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Weitz bases his discussion in Wingenstein's notion
of family resemblance [W5, pp. 31-331_ To use
Wittgenstein's example, if we are confronted with
the question "What is a game?" we shall find
ourselves unable to provide a satisfactory set of
necessary and sufficient conditions. Not all games
have rules, not all involve competition, not all are
purely recreational, etc. What we can do is point
out resemblances between those entitities which we
have chosen to call games. If a new candidate for
gamehood presents itself, we base our decision
whether to expand the concept to embrace it on the
resemblances we perceive between the new activity
and those previously admitted. Weitz notes that
with regard to an we could always choose to "close
the concept" by legislating strict standards of
admittance, but to do so would, as he puts it,
"foreclose on creativity"-a seemingly self-
defeating decision.
This last approach-that of choosing to close the
concept-is the option foundational philosophies
of mathematics seem to offer. But when
mathematics is regarded primarily as an activity
(i.e.. historically. culturally and in actual practice)
this option as well seems to be a particularly self-
defeating decision. Viewed this way, in fact.
mathematics increasingly presents itself as a
flexible and debatable open concept. As an
example, consider the attitudes mathematicians
have historically held regarding the existence of
infinitesimal s. Does the long history of this issue
between the times of Eudoxus and modem non-
standard analysis suggest anything but the
perennial flexibility and debatabiliry of this
concept? What of "dimension," "continuity," or
"real number?" Perhaps most teIlingly. consider
the notion of "proof." Is this a closed concept, or
have our criteria of what constitutes a valid
mathematical argument themselves been (and
continue to be) flexible and debatable? Consider
the positions available with regard to the use of
computers in proof. Tymockzo [T4, pp. 243-266]
asks whether if we regard the a-color theorem as
having been proved. must we not also admit that its
proof is of an entirely different nature from any that
have come before it?
Although Weitz considers essentalist arguments to
be misguided in purpose, he does not consider the
particular issues they raise to be irrelevant. These
theories provide, in fact, "a series of
invaluable...directions for attending to art," and
concludes that:
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If we take aesthetic theori es literally...they
all fail; bur if we reconstrue them, in terms
of function and point. ..as recommendations
to concentrate on certain criteria [they are]
far from wonhless. [They] teach us what
to look at in art. ([W I]. p. 156)
Similarly. if we demand of our philosophies of
mathematics a sec ure foundation capable of
supporting the entire struc ture of the subject we
may well be fundamentally misguided. However,
foundational philosophies have been successful in
raising relevant issues and thereby provoking us to
fresh insights. In both art and mathematics, non-
essentialism move s us toward a pluralistic view of
our endeavors, one that recognizes that there is not
a single, absolute perspective but many-possibly
not even mutually consistent- viewpoints. By no
means, however, should pluralism be confused
with a kind of bland eclecticism or---even worse--
blind subjectivism. On the contrary. the holding of
finn ind ividual views is probably necessary to
create the productive tensions that dri ve ou r
activ ities as a whole. One can be generally non-
pluralist with regard to one 's own philosophy and
generally pluralist with regard to mathematics or an
as a whole. (For a discussion of this stance with
regard to an see Danto 's "Learning to Live with
Pluralism" in [02]).
The recognition of both an and mathe matics as
open concepts leaves behind it a curious casuality.
The claim that mathematics is an an seems to have
lost its meaning. But in its place has arisen the
prospect of a much more active agenda-that of
seeking family resemblances between the two
fields. That any resemblances we find are indeed
familial ones I do not find objectionable-e-rhe
underlying conceptions of the essenti alist theories
in each fiel d just ifies their membershi p in a
common philosophical "family." In the remainder
of this article] would like to address just a few of
the areas where some useful resemblances of this
kind might be sought.
Family Resemblances between Art
and Mathematics
Mathematics and Techne
One of the central points in the Croce-Collingwood
theory is the distinction between art and techne, or
craft. Rec all that in this theory the form er is
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equivalent to expression, while the latter is
identified with activities engaged in to attain a
specific result Even without wholly accepting this
theory, the desire for such a distinction seems
desirable. Techne is composed of specific,
trainable skills; an not only marshals these skills.
but transcends them in some not clearly defmeable
manner. Mixing paints or mastering scales is
techne; The Madonna of the Rocks or an original
jazz improvisation is art. Propaganda as
propaganda is tecbne; propaganda in the fonn of
Eisenstein's Potemkin somehow becomes art.
A similar distinction seems valid in mathematics,
and could well be crucial in education. Finding the
greatest common divisor of two numbers through
following some recipe is techne; deriving a process
along the lines of Euclid's algorithm, convincing
oneself and others that it works, or deve loping a
geometric interpretation of it (in short,
understanding it) is mathematics. Even a brief
peru sal of most secondary level textbooks or
examin ations reve als a tremendous emphasis on
techne. But to what degree are " skills" nonetheless
necessary , and which particular ones? Can and
should these be approached in a more
"mathematical" manner? If mathematics proper is
something that cannot bedirectly taught. how can it
In both art and mathematics, non-
essentialism moves us toward a
pluralistic view of our endeavors,
one that recognizes that there is not
a single, absolute perspective but
many-possibly not even mutually
consistent-viewpoints,
be productively devel oped? Approaching these
issue s seems to require a sharper disitnction
between " math proper" and "math fal sely so-
called" than now exists. (Consider: To what
degree is formal proof a matter of techne '1 Is much
of the "mathematics proper" completed by the rime
we reach this stage?)
A final open note on this subject: The mathltechne
di stinction appe ars to cut across that of
pure/applied mathematics, and in certain respects
may prove to be more a fruitful one. Consider
architecture. Is this pure or applied art? Is it art or
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techne? Which question gives us a more useful
perspective in contrasting Frank Lloyd Wright ' s
Fallingwater with tract housing? Now what of.
say, the theory of relativity, or the activity of
mathematicalmodelling?
Style
Among the most perplexing questions concerning
the nature and history of art are those involving the
issue of style. Why have diffe rent individual
artists. or the artists of different cultures, nations
and ages represented the world in such different
ways? How is it even possible for them to have
done so, and then for others to be able to recognize
and apprec iate their works? How do es an
approach to these issues regarding representation
translate into the perception of style among non-
representational works? Could art have evolved in
only one possible way? What is the significance of
style? (The first questions are broached by
Gombrich [G l]; the last by Goodman [G3])
These top ics have not been en tirely alien to
mathemati cs, even if they have not bee n
approached in terms of the overrid ing concept of
sty le. Compari sons of Greek and modern
mathematic s have often been approached with
rega rd to wha t are effec tive ly stylis tic
considerat ions, and from at least the time of
Poin care writers have contrasted individual
geomeoic "s tyles" with arithmetic or analytic ones.
However, style has not played the unifying role in
historical or philosophical studies of mathematical
thinking that it has in art. Possibly this is due to an
attitude which views mathematical progress in a
deterministic, unitary manner-a great chain of
mathematical being, so to speak.
There have been indications of change. Educators
speak of the role of "cognitive styles" and "multiple
representations" in the learning of the subjec t, and
Oue has written of a "complementary" relationship
between arithmetic and geometry which is as
suggestive of corresponding artistic styles or media
as it is of modern physics [O J. Furthermore, the
emerging field of ethnomathematics ([011& [A2])
seems to offer a particularly fresh approach to the
nature of mathematical styles developed outside
traditonal academic settings. Possibly all these
workers may have something to gain from the
methods and results of art history and psychology
with respect to style.
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One funhe r note along these lines: In [D4, p. 318],
Davis and Hersh point to the relative permanence
of mathematical results as opposed to scientific
ones. This suggests a further stylistic affinity
between mathematics and the arts. Just as Picasso
did not relegate Rembrandt to the attic, modem
geometry does not invalidate Euclid. (Note the
curren t state of Aristoteli an physics. however.)
Still, just as we can no longer look upon
Rembrandt with anything but modem eyes, we
must reinterpret Euclid in light of our current
position. The development of mathematics has
certainly been allied closely with that of science;
however. the nature of the subject's history itself
may bear more similarity with that of art. (This
point is suggested by Thomas Kuhn [K2, p. 345].)
A conception of the history of mathematics in terms
Just as Picasso did not relegate
Rembrandt to the attic, modern
geometry does not invalidate
Euclid. Still , just as we can no
longer look upon Rembrandt with
anything but modern eyes, we must
reinterpret Euclid in light or our
cur rent position.
of stylistic change might provide a better handle on
this phenomenon than one which views the
development of mathematics as analagous to that of
science.
Ethics
If the philosophy of art often seems a rather dry
and erudite affair, there is at least one set of issues
over which it becomes both heated and public-
that of censorship and the moral obligations of the
artist. Are there general topics from which the
artist. or particular works from which the public,
should be restricted access? Similarly. is the artist
obliged to deal with any particular topics or
situations? If each of the opposed paths of strict
moralism and unrestricted aestheticism appear
undesireable, what positions are left open to us?
These have been among the most discussed issues
in the philosophy of art, and can be traced from
such figures as Confucious and Heraclitus through
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•current commentators on the role of the National
Endowment for the Arts,
Issue s of a simila r nature have arisen more
frequently in mathematics in recent years. (Davis
and Hersh [D4, pp. 87-89] contrast the extreme
ethical positions of "Mathematical Maoism" and a
form of mathematical aes theticism derived-
perhaps inaccurately-from Hardy.) In general,
however, mathematics (and to a slightly less
extent, science) has been disappointingly slow in
embracing such topics. As more mathematicians
and educators enter into such discussions, it may
well be to their advantage to acquaint themselves
with the manners in which the corresponding
issues have been approached with respect to art. It
might be worthwh ile to point out here one
particular area in which the functioning of each of
mathematics, art and sc ience have gro wn
tremendously similar: All to a large degree depend
primarily for support on governmental or industrial
support ("pa tronage"). The time is ripe for a
genuine dialogue between these areas on this issue
alone.
Aesthetic Issu es
Oddly enough, purely aesthetic considerations have
made few appearances in this discussion. If we
were to adopt a strictly Platonic view of either art
or mathematics we might account for this simply
through invoking Keats: Beauty is truth, truth
beauty. Thou gh a simplification, this formula
nonetheless captures much of the attitude that
allowed realistic views of art and mathematics to
coexi st for centuries with formal conceptions of
beauty (as outli ned in Plato's Philebus). To a
modem day formalist, on the other hand, aesthetic
considerations may well be deemed irrelevant,
either relegated to the "emotive" qualities of the
positivists, or actually defined as the meeting of
certain formal criteria. Neither of these positions,
however, is particularly helpful in ascertaining the
role or nature of aesthe tic judgements in actually
creating art or mathematics.
This is a topic on which the mathematical literature
is vinually mute. Poincare [P4, p. 392J wrote of
aesthetics as serving the role of the "delicate sieve"
through whic h successful mathematical
"combin ati ons" passed on their way to
consciousness, but his sugge stive metaphor has
remained li ttle more than that for some nine
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decades. (Though some interesting development is
attained in [Pt].) This is not to imply that the
artistic literature has itself resolved the problems
posed by the creative imagination, but it has
approached them directly and arrived at apparently
useful di stincti ons and insights. This same
literature may provide a fertile starting ground for
mathematical investigations. For an introduction to
these issues from philosophical and psychological
persepctives, see [SI] and [P3], respectively.
1would like to mention briefly one aesthetic value
which does seem to be pervasive in the
mathematical literature-that of elegance. As
aesthetic values go, this seems to be rather peculiar
If we were to adopt a strictly
Platonic view of either art or
mathematics we might account for
this simply through invoking Keats:
Beauty is truth. truth beauty.
to mathematical studies. (Indeed, the word actually
canies a somewhat negative connotation in, say,
painting or music.) Far from being able 10separate
the positive or negative effects this concept has had
on development, mathematical writers have not
even been particularly clear on just what elegance is
or how it stands in relation to such other concepts
as clarity, conviction, understanding or
significance . It is, however, an aesthetic value (or
at least an apparent aesthetic value) with some
degree of currency in the mathematical community ,
and as such may provide an entry point for
approaching the nature of mathematical aesthetics
in general. My own suspicion is that an overly
formal conception of elegance-say one strictly in
terms of efficiency-s-could hinder development as
much as it motivates it, whereas a pluralistic view
of various attitudes could be genuinely productive .
I would greatly appreciate hearing others' views on
mathematical elegance-particularly examples of
what they find to be elegant and some (however
imprecise) description of what leads them to say
so. (Questions: Does your conception of elegance
primarily involve results or procedures? Does
visualization have anything to do with it? Are there
arguments which you find convincing but still not
satisfying?)
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Conclus ion
Perhaps the most appropriate way to close this
article is to referagain to the epigraph with which it
opened. Superficially, mathematics may appear as
the most austere of human endeavors: rigorous,
analytic and precise. Moredeeply, it reveals itself
as one of the most mysterious. aspiring to aspects
of experience most commonly associated with
philosophy or religion (both of which, incidentally,
Hegel concluded art eventually becomes). To
understand mathematics at this deeper level- to
grasp it as a human activity which itself
human izes-c-requires a perspective that embraces
other humanist endeavors. An- in its richness, its
mysteries and its humanism-offers an abundant
wealth of experience and insight from which
mathematics may have much tolearn of itself.
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